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Submission from NTU to the Risk Assessment and 
Risk Planning Inquiry 
1.1. This submission builds on research and partnerships developed by Associate 
Professor Rowena Hill from Nottingham Trent University supported by 
colleagues from the Department of Psychology and Nottingham Civic Exchange 
pre and post Covid-19 pandemic.  
 
2. Executive Summary 
2.1. This submission focusses on the argument to widen the assessment of risk to 
incorporate the interaction and cascade of impacts in aggregation rather than in 
isolation. Steps to successfully widen the assessment, planning and 
management of risk is considered, including a review of practitioners 
perspective that emergencies are increasing in frequency and complexity, are 
becoming protracted in length, more cascade impacts are resulting from risks, 
and consequentially the capability of critical infrastructure is being significantly 
challenged.  We have highlighted throughout the response to the questions 
how the capability is threatened and how the risk assessment process can be 
developed to alleviate or address some of these challenges. 
 
3. Submission 
3.1. This position is built from our time supporting the C19 National Foresight 
Group between March 2020 and January 2021 and as researchers in the civil 
contingencies and emergencies arena prior to this role.  
3.2. In response to Question 1 regarding the most significant extreme risks the UK 
faces, our research from IOR 2 (pages 69 -60) suggests the need for a complete 
paradigm shift in risk assessment.  
3.3. “Delegates putting forward this view suggested that due to society living 
differently, with increased connectivity and globalisation, the nature of 
emergencies had changed. According to this view, emergencies are becoming 
increasingly societal wide (Covid-19, EU Transition, Climate Emergency) and so 
the definition used to define, quantify, plan and mitigate risk needs to change 
to accommodate elongated, ubiquitous incidents with a potential associated 
increase in incidents that are nationwide”. 
3.4. The frequency and length of time the emergency management structures have 
been stood up and in operation across the UK were perceived to be increasing 
before the pandemic. This means either our definition of a significant risk needs 
re-evaluating as it is too low in threshold, our resources are too low to respond 
(triggering a major incident at a lower level of complexity or challenge), or our 
world is becoming more complex with interaction between and cascade of 
consequences from risks is becoming the most significant risk (in scale, nature 
or complexity of managing the impacts). Our research suggests that even 
before the pandemic, the vulnerability for the UK was not going to be from one 
specific risk. The system is challenged during complex incidents which have 
been occurring at a greater rate. This complexity occurs when a threat covers 
an area broader than a county geographical footprint, causes a cascade of 
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further risks or threat which aggregates on top of the original risk, is systemic 
in its impact across different service provision of areas of society, or is an 
elongated event lasting longer than a few weeks or months. The impact of 
these events is not from the absolute or relative risk of one threat or risk, but 
the risk to critical infrastructure and capability following the consequences of 
the risk. The layering of consequences becomes more impactful, having a 
cascade effect of resource drain and reduced capability. This was further 
demonstrated during the pandemic. Currently the NSRA and the Civil 
Contingencies Act (CCA) and associated frameworks are built to assess and 
manage risk and threat in relative isolation. However, as we have seen in the 
Covid-19 pandemic, each additional level of risk adds to the complexity and 
makes the system more unstable and vulnerable to structural failure and stress. 
i.e. systemic wide flooding, EU Transition and Covid-19 pandemic. This was 
further demonstrated with D20, December 2020 being the month when winter 
pressures, EU Transition and Covid-19 pandemic would all be dealt with by the 
same set up structures and infrastructure at once. The aggregation of the 
interaction between, or cascade effects from, identified risks needs a framework 
to consider and scope the consequences quickly for the planning and 
management to be more effective, rather than the risk assessment being 
limited to a likelihood/severity prediction of risks in isolation. In this way the 
risk assessment needs to develop from a more isolated matrix to consider the 
integration of those risks with each other and/or the cascade of impacts from 
each of those risks in isolation or integrated with each other within the matrix. 
Whilst the structures enacted by the implementation of the CCA through a 
major incident being declared is successful in managing these isolated 
risks/threats and ‘docking’ with the national level coordination of resources, this 
is significantly challenged in a national emergency. This is because the 
principles of subsidiarity and coordination of mutual aid, on which the CCA is 
predicated, is not facilitated. Our evidence from the pandemic suggests that 
subsidiarity (lowest level of decision-making and highest level of coordination 
of resources) was inverted. The decision-making was drawn to the national 
level and the coordination of resources was not able to be coordinated at a 
national level and so it was pushed to a local level. This results in a challenge to 
the assigned decision-making flow and placement of decision-making power in 
the management of the pandemic.  
3.5. In response to Question 2, our research has established that the management 
of emergencies is challenged by the differing geographical footprints at which 
different sectors operate. Health in particular have a different size of geography 
to most other emergency, essential or statutory responders. With most sector 
and services operating at County level, and health operating at regional level, 
there is a challenge to the alignment of those structures which manage that 
emergency. Until this is resolved, there will always be a misalignment 
throughout all emergency responses (nearly all of which need a health 
response to the direct event, or the immediate consequences of it).  
3.6. In response to Question 3, we see room for improvement in the governance 
and the degree to which the risk assessment process is open to scrutiny and 
the input of experts. The national emergency of the pandemic has clearly 
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evidenced structural challenges of emergency management and resilience 
within England and this scales up further to the docking and sharing between 
the four nations. This can be seen clearly in our first, second, third IOR reports, 
our report on managing local health protection areas and our Managing the 
First 230 Days report, as well as our latest report regarding LRF Learning. The 
Civil Contingencies Act 2004 works reasonably well at county or regional level. 
Our research has shown that a UK wide national emergency overwhelms this 
legislation and framework very quickly (IOR 2) and this impacts on the nature 
and consequences of the risks identified through the NSRA process. The NSRA 
process itself is eroding in its transparency and ability to be scrutinised. As 
researchers in this area, but more compellingly as UK citizens, we cannot 
access this assessment in its latest version. For scrutiny, trust, warning and 
informing and education of the public this is a significant limiting factor and 
should be addressed. Our research has also suggested that the challenge of 
how the current process is carried out is limiting. The experts consulted are a 
cadre of professionals and experts in the area of risk within which they operate. 
The cadre needs to be expanded to include experts in how emergency planning 
and resilience is managed to usefully inform and provide an evidence base to 
the consideration of aggregate, concurrent events.  
3.7. Our research informs Question 4, as it has shown that across the UK those at 
local level would like a full consideration of the level of assurance of the 
resilience structures and standards (see associated evidence for 
Recommendations 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 2.5, 2.6 from IOR1, 5.1, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6 from 
IOR2 which are relevant and 1.6 in IOR3 which specifically calls for this). Across 
our analysis of three reviews of frontline first and secondary responders 
through 2020 (link to IORs) colleagues managing the pandemic response, EU 
transition and local emergencies highlighted the need to re-visit the way they 
are held to account, and the re-focussing and sustaining of Civil Contingencies 
and risk management as a priority activity. An inspection of resilience 
standards would be broadly welcomed as would the inspection of Local 
Resilience Forums which recognise the need for an introduction of two 
additional stages within emergencies of a complex and longer-term nature. 
Covid-19 has seen the implementation of a number of new bodies to support 
the national effort (LOEBs and JBC alongside the reforming of PHE) which has 
highlighted the evolving operating model. There is much to learn from 
professionals on the frontline who have enacted new innovative solutions and 
who have had to mesh new initiatives to the current systems. An inspection 
against standards would also increase the accountability and capture the work 
that goes on within these structures and legitimise the provision of resources 
from the partnership organisations. This should include the development of the 
standards of a Multi-Agency Information Cell (MAIC) to increase the flow of 
intelligence and alleviate the challenge of the paucity of information with which 
to make local evidence-based decisions. The adoption and implementation of 
the JESIP doctrine should also form part of that inspection, because our 
research shows the strength of the multi-agency partnership directly 
contributes to the effectiveness of the management of the emergency. This 
doctrine is currently being reviewed and we have fed into that process through 
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our products, as well as highlighting this in our response to the Integrated 
Review.  
3.8. In response to Question 5, our research shows that the government could 
complete better societal forecasting of the changing nature of society and 
technology and where our emerging true dependencies are. This has become 
apparent in the pandemic management where increased dependency on 
technology produced an increased risk from cyber failure or sabotage, or power 
outage than before. This cascade effect of consequences from one risk or threat 
impacting on the capability and vulnerability of critical infrastructure should be 
accounted for at national level to save replication of this work at local level 
across the UK. This is what we have seen in the Covid-19 pandemic and so for 
efficiency and accuracy reasons this scoping and identifying of cascade effects 
should be included in the future methodology of consideration of risk and 
threat.  
3.9. In response to Question 6, our research during the pandemic highlights how 
well the national contingency plans are communicated to and understood by 
those at a local level, including emergency responders. To increase the 
capability of local responders to effectively plan for and respond to 
emergencies the government should significantly increase its communication 
of options, reasonable worst-case scenarios, data, intelligence, decision-
making, strategy, and policy in a timely and transparent way. Our research has 
established this has not been achieved throughout the Covid-19 pandemic. In 
our research we argue for future reviews to be cognisant and address any 
future (non-Covid related) participation from local political stakeholders. This 
has been challenging throughout the pandemic (see IOR 2, 3 and page 9 of 
Managing the First 230 Days), but an important part of risk communication with 
the public. The emergency responders are well briefed through local activities, 
plans and Local Resilience Forums. However there has been little bi-directional 
communication or strategy sharing at national level. At the local level the Civil 
Contingencies roles and portfolios should be valued in higher regard more 
consistently as they tend to move in and out of priority depending on the 
declaration of a major incident. These roles need more training resource and an 
established career development and growth pathway.  
3.10. Our research informs Question 7. The Civil Contingencies Secretariat appears 
to have adequately supported Government departments to address risks within 
their remits, however further oversight or accountability is required. This is 
mostly based on our work throughout the Covid-19 pandemic and the 
management of this. Our research demonstrates a lack of coordinated 
approach across government with conflicting or absent advice from across the 
different departments. There is no longer an approach of department primacy, 
the consequence of this is that there is little structure or system of decision-
making for other departments or local level decision-makers to plan against. 
This leaves a network/holistic approach to decision-making and guidance in an 
emergency, which is legitimate and has worked in other countries, but in 
England, our evidence suggests a silo approach to working within departments 
that does not facilitate a network or holistic approach to policy or guidance 
development. Consequently, the challenges to cross departmental working 
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within government and across the four nations during the pandemic has 
created significant operational and strategic challenges for local strategic 
decision-makers. 
3.11. In response to Questions 9, 11 and 12, our research indicates that, particularly 
in the case of health emergencies such as the Covid-19 pandemic, the 
behaviours of individual members of the public are key in a successful 
response. However, the behaviour of individuals does not occur independently 
of governmental response but is rather shaped by the communication strategy 
of leaders, with trust being the most important determinant of adherence to 
recommended behaviours. Openness and transparency, with clear information 
and accurate presentations of risk increases trust and the perception of 
reliability, which increase the likelihood of individuals engaging in positive 
emergency response behaviours. Conversely, a lack of co-ordination and 
consistency can lead to confusion and frustration, and individual behaviours 
may then undermine the disaster response. Similarly, community level activity 
and engagement can increase preparedness and resilience to disasters, but this 
again requires investment and support from central government. Engagement 
at the community level can identify and prepare for risks before they occur, and 
collaboration across jurisdictional boundaries that may not be locally 
meaningful improves resilience and efficiency. This engagement and 
collaboration needs to be motivated and facilitated by government, who should 
support horizontal and ground-up structures of organisation to develop rather 
than impose top-down command and control structures. The utility of such 
collaborations had been evidenced in our work with LRFs and partner 
organisations, where collaboration and innovation at the local level has led to 
effective and efficient responses in challenging circumstances. As well as 
collaboration at the national-local and local-local government levels, better 
integration and collaboration between the public and private sphere would 
increase resiliency, particularly in terms of critical infrastructure. These public-
private relationships are often complex, with multiple stakeholders, 
governmental levels, authorities and arrangements. Simplifying, consolidating 
or mapping these relationships would increase situational awareness and allow 
for the identification of vulnerabilities and the alignment of business interests 
and continuity plans with the community, increasing the efficiency of the 
response. 
3.12. Question 10 asks what is needed to develop resilience capability. Our research 
demonstrates that there needs to be a significant increase in the resource 
allocation to the creation and sharing of intelligence. There has been a paucity 
of data, information and intelligence of the impacts of the pandemic which has 
significantly impacted on the ability to plan and develop policy at a local level 
on real time. Our research has demonstrated significant challenges of 
communication and decision-making flow at local level which has impinged on 
professionals’ abilities to tackle the risks posed by the pandemic. This is 
primarily due to the pace or turnaround times of Government announcement of 
guidance or policy and the implementation time. The challenges from the 
differing sized geographical footprints to the integration of intelligence, the 
integration of plans and the silo approach this facilitates should be resolved 
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moving forward. The evidence from our work suggests that the pandemic is 
challenging critical infrastructure as outlined in the discussions above due to 
the consequences of concurrent events or the amount of impacts across society 
from the Covid-19 pandemic and the length of time the structures have been 
stood up and the integration of new structures established for Covid-19 (such 
as the Joint Biosecurity Centre and the Local Outbreak Engagement Boards). 
The capability of the local response is not the relevant issue according to our 
evidence base. They are knowledgeable, experienced and prepared. The issue 
is their capacity, the draw and drain of energy, time and resources to Covid-19 
has meant the ability to respond to another emergency of significant size and to 
continue to run the rest of public service provision and critical infrastructure is 
a significant challenge. In other words, the plans are in place, but we do not 
know if the resource and ability of people to manage that across the UK is 
available to deliver those plans. This means that at local level, risk 
preparedness is theoretically prepared for, but the capability from existing, 
already stretched resource to deliver those plans is a point of significant 
concern. Our research shows that during the pandemic the system of sharing 
reasonable worst-case assumptions failed. The original assessment of the risk 
was adequate, but the subsequent release of continuing and updated analysis 
of that risk, specifically the impacts of the event unfolding, failed. This is not a 
failure of the original approach or methodology, but how that continues to 
operate. The local responders are used to working with uncertainty, and the 
expert, scientific and technological professionals are also used to working in 
uncertainty. Through the pandemic our research suggests it was ministerial 
level at which the block of RWCS occurred. The likelihood of this happening 
again in future emergencies should be removed. The RWCS allow local 
strategic managers to plan against those assumptions on the understanding 
they are assumptions not predictions or certainty. This was not possible during 
the Covid-19 pandemic, causing duplication of effort and lack of reasonable 
planning through the lack of release of assumptions. The process in future 
should consider ways that differing expert views can be integrated in a more 
transparent way and be released to local strategic decision-makers to allow 
policy-based decisions to reduce duplication of effort, or planning being carried 
out against old or inaccurate data (see examples in IOR 1 pages 36-43 and IOR 2 
recommendation 1.1 and associated evidence and page 9 of Managing the First 
230 Days).  
 
4. Recommendations 
4.1. Our submission argues that HM Government should consider widening the 
paradigm within which the risk assessment, planning and management is 
considered, including a review of practitioners perspective that emergencies 
are increasing in frequency and complexity, that risks are becoming protracted, 
causing cascade impacts, and the consequences of this is threatening the 
capability of critical infrastructure.  We have highlighted throughout the 
response to the questions how the capability is threatened and how the risk 
assessment process can be developed to alleviate or address some of these 
challenges.  





5.1. Dr Rowena Hill is an Associate Professor of Psychology from Nottingham Trent 
University. She was on secondment for ten months to the C19 National 
Foresight Group, a cross-governmental group to consider the longer-term 
impacts of Covid-19 and to provide academic insights and an evidence base to 
the considerations of the group. The C19 National Foresight Group is now 
decommissioned. This submission is on behalf of NTU and not the C19 
National Foresight Group as their mandate has now ended. The submission 
therefore draws on the work conducted by the academics on this group during 
it’s time of operating but is not a submission on behalf of the C19 National 
Foresight Group. Dr Hill has led research projects funded by the ESRC.  
 
5.2. Dr Hill has been researching emergency management and resilience for the 
past five years. She has been researching alongside emergency responders 
specifically for over 15 years and has a strong publication record. Dr Hill has 
also been the lead author of reports which led on roundtable discussions with 
practitioners involved in the Covid-19 response and produced reports on these 
that have been disseminated to the resilience community across England. She 
is the lead author on the C19 National Foresight Group products, including 
Interim Operational Reviews commissioned by the C19 National Foresight 
Group. These are a series of UK wide rapid reviews focussing on the 
management of Covid-19, held in April 2020, June 2020 and September 2020 
with representation from across the resilience and emergency management 
community. These have been written up as reports and published on NTU’s 
website. Dr Hill will be happy to discuss the details of any of these projects at 
any future meeting of the committee. 
 
5.3. Research collaborators relating to this inquiry include: 
• Rich Pickford, Knowledge Exchange Officer, Nottingham Trent 
University (supported the creation of this submission.)  
• Adam Potter, contract researcher engaged by NTU for their C19 
Foresight work. Adam provides research assistance. (supported the 
creation of this submission.)   
• Dr Duncan Guest, Associate Professor, Nottingham Trent University 
• Dr Stacey Stewart, contract researcher engaged by NTU for their C19 
Foresight work. Dr Stewart provides research assistance.  
• Stephanie Bianco, contract researcher engaged by NTU for their C19 
Foresight work. Stephanie provided research assistance.                                   
• Dr Sally Andrews, Lecturer in Psychology, Nottingham Trent University.  
• Dr Lisa Sanderson, Lecturer in Psychology, Nottingham Trent University.  
• Professor Thom Baguley, Professor in Psychology, Nottingham Trent 
University.  
• Professor Nigel Wright, Deputy Vice-Chancellor, Nottingham Trent 
University.  
Additional colleagues provided research and insights to the material our group has 
produced. These can be shared with the inquiry if required. 
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